Roll the dice

First-round picks are nothing more than a pricey gamble

When I worked for the Jets, it was just about this time of the year when the owner would ask me how negotiations with our first-round pick were going. I'd tell him about the status of our talks and he always wanted to know how many years the contract would be. He wasn't concerned with fitting the deal under the cap; he was interested in knowing whether the player would ever play the length of the contract or whether we were throwing money out the window.

So every June I would find myself looking back at the first-rounders from the draft five years earlier to understand the probable success of that year's pick. Should a team expect its first-rounder to play out his contract? With that exercise in mind I went back to check on the Class of 1998. I found there is still a significant degree of uncertainty about matching contracts to first-round players.

Back in 1998, the 30 first-round picks collected about $130 million in signing bonuses, an average of more than $4 million per player. Their contracts averaged just over five years in length and the total contract value for the round was near $275 million -- $9 million per player. Let's take a look at what happened to these players -- they should be in the prime of their careers now.

Five of the 30 aren't even playing in the NFL. Third overall choice Andre Wadsworth, No. 5 Curtis Enis, No. 18 Robert Edwards, No. 29 John Avery and No. 30 Marcus Nash are gone for one reason or another. Edwards may try yet another comeback, but that's a long shot at best. The truth is 17 percent didn't make it. I'm being more than kind to Ryan Leaf by not putting him in this category since he's trying to stick with his fourth team in five years. The Chargers sure didn't get their $31 million worth from Leaf. With Leaf in the mix here, you could make the case that 20 percent of this draft was a financial bust.

Four of the 30 (No. 2 Leaf, No. 10 Duane Starks, No. 27 Victor Riley and No. 28 R.W. McQuarters) no longer play for the teams that originally drafted them. Add that 13 percent of the field to the 17 percent above and that's 30 percent of first-round picks who didn't last with the teams that gave them the big money coming out of college. In the real world, a 30 percent risk raises some serious questions.

Then there are the guys who can't stay healthy enough to be considered great value for the money they were paid. Fred Taylor, No. 9 overall, has missed 44 percent of all Jaguars games during this time with injuries; No. 14 Jason Peter has made just 20 starts in 64 games. These two represent another 6 percent of risk for the owners' money. Sometimes people forget injuries are a big part of the football equation.

Moving to the other end of the spectrum, only three true Pro Bowl players have emerged from this draft class (No. 1 Peyton Manning, No. 4 Charles Woodson and No. 21 Randy Moss) after four years. Ten percent of this group deserves a franchise tag and are worth every penny they were paid. Ten percent is not very good odds when shelling out this kind of dough.

There are a number of very good players you could argue were worth the first-round money. No. 6 Grant Wistrom, No. 7 Kyle Turley, and No. 13 Takeo Spikes lead a group of 10 (33 percent) who have performed at varying levels of success. They present little buyer's remorse and were solid investments.

And that leaves six guys -- No. 16 Kevin Dyson, for one, with his 34 receptions a year -- who perform more like second- or third-rounders and have to be considered just average. This 20 percent was overpaid coming out of college and add more risk than reward. So after studying the Class of 1998, I would have to tell my owner that there's a 40 percent chance the player we pick this year won't be around for the length of the contract or will be a less than adequate contributor five years from now when we will have already paid him 80 percent of his deal.

Things this year may be even more complicated as many negotiating conversations are about longer contracts, not shorter ones. Yes, mistakes are made in personnel evaluations, but the idea that teams would consider six- or seven-year contracts in 2002 only raises the risk for the clubs. Longer deals mean bigger signing bonuses and the probability of an NFL player lasting seven years is significantly lower than him going five. This is a risk most owners would never take in the business world.

Can you imagine telling the president of a company that you'd like to put your organization into a venture that has nearly a 50 percent chance of failure? You would be looking for work real soon. And speaking of unemployment, more than 60 percent of the head coaches who drafted those 30 players back in 1998 no longer have their jobs. That turnover just adds to the difficulty of a first-round pick playing out the length of his rookie deal.

Pat Kirwan, who spent 12 years as a pro football coach, scout and personnel administrator, is an NFL analyst for CNNSI.com.

 

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